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Abstract:
I suggest that the transformation of an artifact from
an introductory-type instrument into a viable, col-
lectively used tool cannot be understood solely in
terms of gradual adaptation of the technology and
user environment, but also as a qualitatively broader
integration process in which an expansion takes
place. The case illustrated a constrained shift of an
artifact from its first adopter, an individual pioneer
user, to a more collective user in institutional medi-
cine. The artifact, a neuromagnetometer instrument
for brain research and diagnostics, brings together
physicists, neuroscientists, physicians as well as var-
ious practitioners from the medical imaging indu-
stry. I applied an activity-theoretical framework for
analysing the adoption of the neuromagnetometer
from the pioneer phase of implementation into the
more established use. The case showed that the an-
ticipated transformation of the artifact constituted a
major challenge for the user organization and its
practitioners. It is suggested that an expansion of the
object into a shared object of implementation among
the separate practitioner groups is indispensable.
This expansion of the object involves for the practi-
tioners to recognize both the different objects and
requirements of the pioneer phase of the implemen-
tation and the new phase of introduction into med-
ical practice. It is shown that this recognition does
not, however, come as given, spontaneously born in
the transition. The emerging new object may remain
only partially shared if not made visible by delibe-
rate effort among the practitioners. The expansion
requires collective visualization of the work and re-
flective dialogue on it. Employing analytical tools,
such as the activity-theoretical concepts used here, is
one possible way of facilitating such an effort.
1. Introduction
How does a community adopt an arti-fact? Or, the other way around, howdoes an artifact become part of a
community and collective practice? This
general theoretical question has taken vari-
ous forms in empirical studies of social sci-
ences. It has also been approached, with a
more normative standpoint and practical vo-
cabulary, in a variety of studies on manage-
ment and organization.2 Has the problem
been studied to closure, or is there a need for
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Blind Men and the Elephant1:
Implementation of a New Artifact as an
Expansive Possibility
Mervi Hasu
1 “Blind Men and the Elephant” is a poem by John
Godfrey Saxe (1816-1887).
2 Introducing an innovation, a new technological artifact,
into the market has been a classical problem in economi-
cal and management studies of technology and innovation
(e.g., Kline & Rosenberg, 1986; Burgelman & Maidique,
1988; Rothwell, 1994). It has been shown in empirical
studies that introduction to the market and diffusion of in-
novation is a non-linear, iterative and uncertain process.
Classical studies in the field have identified categories of
innovators, adopters and change agents as ideal-typical
categories (e.g., Rogers, 1983). These analyses have fo-
cused on firm level and assumed shared values of all ac-
tors involved. Questions of learning, user-producer rela-
tions and networks have emerged in many studies during
the 1990s (e.g., Lundvall, 1992; Biemans, 1992; Fleck,
1994; von Hippel & Tyre, 1995). More recent studies
have integrated ideas and methods from social construc-
tivism and actor network theory (e.g., Coombs & al.,
1996).
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new perspectives and findings? For a stu-
dent of education interested in interaction
and learning taking place in the implemen-
tation of complex technological artifacts,
this is a pertinent and urgent question.
The artifact studied in the present paper, a
measuring instrument for brain research and
diagnostics, is a transitional, hybrid artifact:
in its current phase of development it brings
together physicists, neuroscientists, physi-
cians as well as various practitioners from
the medical imaging industry. This artifact,
a neuromagnetometer3, originating from the
research on low temperature physics during
the 1970s and 1980s, has been lately com-
mercialized and introduced into hospital en-
vironment. As a new research instrument,
able to provide localizing information of the
brain functions, it has attracted clinical neu-
rophysiologists and radiologists in research
hospitals and has been demonstrated to be a
potential clinical tool in epilepsy surgery
and brain tumor surgery practices. It may
constitute a new diagnostic imaging device,
following the establishment of modern radi-
ology and the integration of magnetic reso-
nance imaging (MRI) technology to radiol-
ogy practice (Blume, 1992). The question of
when and in which medical practice the
clinical application of the technology will
become established remains open.
As a key aspect in the overall develop-
ment of technology, implementation has
been distinguished from technical develop-
ment and installation per se (e.g., Leonard-
Barton & Kraus, 1985; Fincham & al.,
1995; Voss, 1994). Implementation “invol-
ves the organization, its goals and strategies,
and is the process through which technology
is concretely deployed.” It is “the process
through which technical, organizational, and
financial resources are configured to provide
an efficiently operating system” (Fincham &
al., 1995, 190). The interaction of various
specialists, and the collaboration between
organizations and sub-groups during the de-
velopment and implementation of technolo-
gy has been identified as a crucial precondi-
tion for deploying the artifact to practical
use, constitutive to the processes of im-
provement, redesign, and creation of viable
and commercially successful products (e.g.,
Shaw, 1985; Leonard, 1998; von Hippel,
1988; von Hippel, Thomke & Sonnack,
1999), standardization of new technologies
and products (e.g., Timmermans & Berg,
1997), and market creation for new techno-
logies and services (e.g., Green, 1992; Ad-
ler, Riggs & Wheelwright, 1989).
What is, then, the key process underlying
successful implementation, potentially lead-
ing to a breakthrough application? Accord-
ing to Leonard (1998, 104), mutual adapta-
tion is the “reinvention of the technology to
conform to the work environment and the si-
multaneous adaptation of the organization to
use the new technical system” that occurs in
small and large recursive spirals of change.
The adaptive spirals involve both technolo-
gical and organizational redesign, and vary
in magnitude, depending on how fundamen-
tal is the change to be made in the imple-
mentation (ibid. p. 105). Large adaptive cy-
cles, requiring major, qualitative changes in
technology and user organizations are sup-
posed to be of special importance for orga-
nizations facing the challenge of implement-
ing a hybrid artifact such as the neuromag-
netometer studied in the present paper. Tur-
ning the artifact to a potential new “track” in
the development, in this case, from research
to clinical environment, is a difficult and
challenging endeavor for the organizations
6
3 Magnetoencephalography (MEG) is the measurement
of extracranial magnetic fields produced by electrical cur-
rents within the brain. Special devices are needed to mea-
sure the magnetic fields. Sensitive (superconducting
quantum interference device) sensors can function only at
a temperature of liquid helium (-269 Celsius).
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and people involved.
Fincham & al. (1995) have pointed out
that the difficulties in getting complex tech-
nologies to practical use have been long re-
cognized, though not widely acknowledged
in implementation studies. The points of
view of various practitioners and occupa-
tional groups involved in the use of the new
artifact are seldom distinguished, rather,
“adopter organization” is typically seen as a
unified entity and a target for managerial ac-
tion (Voss, 1994). Studies focused on the
adoption process in target organizations
have directed attention to what various kinds
of managers, technical specialists, trade
union representatives, and others who have
access to decision making, do in the adop-
tion of new technology (e.g., Preece, 1989).
A problem not commonly addressed is
the complex transformation of communities,
and the integration of new practitioners and
occupational groups, during the implemen-
tation of the new artifact (for an exception,
see Barley, 1986, also Blume, 1992). I shall
argue that there is a need for theoretical and
methodological perspectives, sensitive and
focused enough to capture the complex dy-
namics between the artifact, the communi-
ties participating in the implementation, and
the various practitioners involved in the
process of applying the new artifact.
The specific issue approached in the pre-
sent paper is the transition of the artifact
from its first adopter, an individual pioneer
user, to a collective user organization. How
is individual use expertise transferred into a
collectively mastered expertise, and what is
the significance of that transition for the in-
novation process? I shall suggest that this
shift is critical and constitutive also to the
sustainability and standardization of the new
artifact.
“As a rule, one organization develops the techno-
logy and then hands it off to users, who are less
technically skilled but quite knowledgeable
about their own areas of application. In practice,
however, the user organization is often not wil-
ling – or able – to take on responsibility for the
technology at the point in its evolution at which
the development group wants to hand it over. The
person responsible for implementation – whether
located in the developing organization, the user
organization, or in some intermediary position –
has to design the hand-off so that it is almost in-
visible. That is, before the baton changes hands,
the runners should have been running in parallel
for a long time.”
(Leonard-Barton and Kraus (1985, 103)
This “hand-off,” and the responsibility for
accomplishing it within the user organiza-
tion are looked at in detail in the present pa-
per. Interesting though the suggestion about
invisibility and smooth adoption is, the pa-
per at hand provides empirical evidence
which suggests that a more complex inter-
pretation of adoption processes needs to be
developed. I shall approach the problem, the
challenge of transferring the artifact from its
individual expert user to a user collective, by
applying the activity-theoretical concept of
expansion or expansive development (En-
geström, 1987; 1999; 2000). I shall argue
that the transformation of the artifact from
an introductory-type instrument into a vi-
able, collectively used tool can not be un-
derstood solely in terms of mutual adapta-
tion. It also needs to be analyzed as a quali-
tatively broader integration process in which
expansion takes – or needs to take – place.
An interest in studying a hybrid artifact,
involving various heterogeneous groups, co-
incides with symbolic interactionist studies
of science that are centered around “hetero-
geneous worlds coming together at work”
(Clarke & Gerson, 1990, p. 200). In scien-
tific work, infrastructure for the specific
kind of research must be created and built
up to keep up with developments. Infra-
structures include instruments, practices and
techniques, and specific knowledge along
7
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with special languages (e.g., Fujimura,
1996; Star, 1989).
The activity-theoretical notion of expan-
sion differs from symbolic interactionist no-
tions of the construction of infrastructures.
Activity-theoretical studies of work have fo-
cused on transformations and have also
made deliberate attempts to develop work
practices, for instance, through concrete vi-
sibilization of the “hidden” or emerging
work activities (e.g., Engeström, 1999; Ha-
su, 2000; Hasu & Engeström, 2000; Miet-
tinen & Hasu, 2000). These studies have re-
ported on developmentally significant con-
tradictions – and solutions by employees –
of work activity in periods of intense
change. People are not only affected by or
adapted to changes. They initiate and seek
new solutions, and actively make sense of
the world they live in. These actions can
lead to a developmental process conceptual-
ized here as expansion.
From the point of view of cultural-histor-
ical activity theory (Leont’ev, 1978; Cole &
Engeström, 1993; Engeström, Miettinen &
Punamäki, 1999), implementation of a new
artifact is seen in the context of object-ori-
ented, collective and artifact-mediated activ-
ity systems constantly undergoing develop-
mental transformations. Implementation is
not accomplished by a single organization
or group: it is directly or indirectly influ-
enced by several communities and practi-
tioner groups. Implementation involves ty-
pically steps in a temporally distributed
chain of interconnected events. Implemen-
tation is not purely technical: it has moral
and ideological underpinnings with regard
to responsibility and power. The trajectory
of implementation and adoption is not re-
stricted to the problem or task at hand in the
local community, it always also shapes the
future of the broader activity system (orga-
nization or network) within which it takes
place. Accordingly, we may identify four di-
mensions of potential expansion in imple-
mentation: the social-spatial (“who else
should be included?”), the anticipatory-tem-
poral (“what previous and forthcoming steps
should be considered?”), the moral-ideolog-
ical (“who is responsible and who de-
cides?”), and the systemic-developmental
(“how does this shape the future of the ac-
tivity?”) (Engeström, 2000).
I shall study a transitional situation in the
implementation and use of a neuromagne-
tometer device at the New Mexico Institute
of Neuroimaging, located at the Veterans
Affairs Medical Center (VAMC) in Albu-
querque, New Mexico, in the summer of
1997. This local implementation and adop-
tion process offers a window, a laboratory
setting, to highlight the complex organiza-
tional situation related to a broader transi-
tion of the innovation from basic research
toward clinical use. This diffusion of inno-
vation, and its broader professional and re-
gulatory contexts, such as protocols of ac-
quiring authorized approval for routine clin-
ical use and of organizing and financing
clinical experimentation, constitute another
viewpoint and a research specialization
which is not focused on, but indirectly re-
ferred to, in this paper.
To analyze implementation as a heteroge-
neous activity, I shall apply the concept of
activity system (Engeström, 1987; Enge-
ström, 1990). Activity systems are mediated
by cultural tools (both material and concep-
tual), rules, and division of labor. The dis-
tinction between individual goal-oriented
action and collective object-oriented activity
is of crucial importance here. The temporal
duration of actions is relatively short. Acti-
vity systems are relatively durable, histori-
cally evolving collective formations that
produce individual actions and consist of
members and groups (community) who
share the same general object. A model of
the basic structure of an activity system is
8
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presented in Figure 1. The subject refers to
the individual or sub-group whose agency is
chosen as the point of view of the analysis.
Figure 1. The mediational structure of an
activity system (Engeström, 1987, p. 78)
The activity-theoretical notion of object
should not be confused with the concept of
goal or objective. The object is to be under-
stood as a project under construction, mov-
ing from potential “raw material” to a mean-
ingful shape and outcome. The motive is
thus embedded in the object of activity. As
organizational activity systems undergo
transitions, for instance, by implementing
new artifacts, they may have to redefine and
expand their objects. The expansion of the
object can take various forms, manifested in
visions, actions and material conditions that
people create during the change process.
The anticipated object determines the hori-
zon of possible individual and group actions
within the collective activity. The expansion
of the object eventually requires expansion
in the rules, tools and division of labor – in
the entire activity system.
The expansion of the object and the entire
activity is not a harmonious process. Mul-
tiple historical layers and perspectives meet
and interact in object construction. Imple-
mentation is multi-voiced. Activity theory
regards developmentally significant contra-
dictions as sources of dynamics in the im-
plementation process. Contradictions mani-
fest themselves in everyday breakdowns and
disturbances and in participants’ improvised
solutions appearing in the concrete use situ-
ations of the technology (e.g., Engeström,
1996; Hasu & Engeström, 2000; also Kosch-
mann, Kuutti & Hickman, 1998).
In the following, I shall first provide a
brief overview of MEG and its transition to
clinical use at the time of the research peri-
od 1996-97. I will then introduce the setting,
the New Mexico Institute of Neuroimaging,
and the data analyzed in this paper. I shall
briefly describe the background of the spe-
cific transition process going on at New
Mexico Institute of Neuroimaging in the
summer of 1997, and proceed to analyze the
perceptions of the four main groups of prac-
titioners involved in the use of the neuro-
magnetometer device concerning the pro-
cess of implementing the device in clinical
use. I shall analyze the perceptions along the
four dimensions of expansion of activity in-
troduced above. Finally, I shall discuss my





The MEG innovation and its use in tran-
sition
The development of the neuromagnetometer
(MEG) device is an example of a science-
based innovation which have had a long
technical development process in university
context before adoption to practical use (del
Campo & al., 1999). In the early 1970s, a
few research groups at university physics
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University of Technology4 and Los Alamos
National Laboratories, started to develop in-
struments for measuring biomagnetism (that
is, magnetic fields of human tissue, e.g.,
eye, heart and the brain). The first instru-
ments were one-detector devices used by
physicists, the builders of the devices who
were enthusiastic and patient enough to ap-
ply the first impractical and clumsy instru-
ments. In the beginning of 1980s, a few neu-
roscientists and neurologists were integrated
in the development and use of MEG. In or-
der to develop MEG as a viable instrument
for basic brain research, more practical mul-
ti-channel instruments and data analysis and
modeling systems were gradually devel-
oped. Also in the late 1980s, the commer-
cialization of MEG was started in the United
States by Biotechnologies Incorporation
(BTI), a firm founded by the pioneer build-
ers of the instrument. Hence, the first multi-
channel devices were also installed in hospi-
tal environment for experimental use.
In the 1990s, MEG was established as a
new, prominent research instrument in brain
research and also as a potential tool for lo-
calizing the functional areas of the brain for
clinical purposes. In 1992, a Finnish spin-
off company introduced the first whole-head
MEG device in the market, and became a
competitor to the leading American manu-
facturer. This second-generation device ca-
pable of covering the entire cortex with one
measurement was one of the key prerequi-
sites for patient measurements and more ad-
vanced clinical use of MEG. In the mid
1990s, several new MEG systems were in-
stalled in research institutes and university
hospitals, and preliminary work with poten-
tial clinical applications was conducted by
pioneer groups in the US and in Finland.
This work was boosted by the companies
because they anticipated opening the clini-
cal market for MEG devices. However, the
anticipated breakthrough in clinical applica-
tions was still to come in 1996-1997, at the
time of the data collection for the present
study. Within this period, the organization
studied in this paper, the New Mexico
Institute of Neuroimaging, was the most ad-
vanced user organization among the Finnish
manufacturer’s customers in practical clini-
cal work.
The technical development of MEG is
not, as such, at the core of the present analy-
sis. Rather, the attempts of the manufactur-
ers and the key user organizations to devel-
op the MEG technology from a research in-
strument into an established medical device
are looked at from the point of view of one
user organization in its early phase of adopt-
ing MEG to medical practice. It should be
noted here that the transition of the artifact
and the transition of the user organization
are different processes with different dy-
namics, which, however, have certain cru-
cial interrelations. The users’ significant role
in redeveloping and designing artifacts has
been recognized, for instance, in the devel-
opment of scientific instruments and me-
dical devices (von Hippel, 1988; Shaw,
1985; 1994). Manufacturers are dependent
on lead users and pioneer groups willing to
apply the often unfinished artifact and co-
develop it with the developers. To illustrate
this multi-faceted and multi-layered charac-
ter of adoption, I shall now turn to the tran-
sition of the user organization.
The New Mexico Institute of
Neuroimaging: Data and setting
The data of the present study was collected
during a six-week intense field work period
at the neuroimaging laboratory, the New
Mexico Institute of Neuroimaging (NMIN),
in the summer of 1997 when it was facing
10
4 The early development of MEG in Finland is described
in Hasu (1999) and Hasu & Engeström, (2000).
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organizational changes after a period of
rapid growth. The primary data consist of
interviews with personnel of the NMIN
working with MEG and referring physicians
at the local hospitals. In addition, ethno-
graphic observations of laboratory work as
well as the videorecorded meetings and use
situations of the multi-modality imaging
technologies are used as data. The occupa-
tional groups analyzed in this paper and in-
volved in the use of MEG and its applica-
tion, Magnetic Source Imaging (MSI), are






























































The New Mexico Institute of Neuroimaging
(hereafter only the Institute) at the Veterans
Affairs New Mexico Regional Federal
Medical Center in Albuquerque, USA, is a
separate, private neuroimaging center hous-
ed in a government-owned hospital. Its main
goal is to “assist neurologists, neurosur-
geons, and psychiatrists in the diagnosis and
treatment of disease through applications of
advanced technology and the development
of new imaging modalities.” Through shar-
ing agreements with the University of New
Mexico and other local hospitals, the In-
stitute provides neuroimaging studies for
patients from the local community, the fed-
eral, state, and private sectors. In 1996, there
MSI=magnetic source imaging, MEG= MEG system (magnetoencephalography technology),
MRI= magnetic resonance imaging, NMIN=New Mexico Institute of Neuroimaging at VA,
VA=Veterans Affairs Hospital, UNM=University of New Mexico
Table 1. Practitioner groups involved in applying MEG at the Institute in 1997
5 The interview with the former principal MEG scientist
of the Institute is included.
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were seven diagnostic neuroimaging pro-
grams at the Institute with more than 20
modalities, one of them the magnetoence-
phalography (MEG) technology and the
magnetic source imaging (MSI) method
used in the localization and imaging of the
functional regions of the brain.
The main clinical application of MEG
used currently at the Institute was the map-
ping of the functional areas of the brain, that
is, the localization of somatosensory, motor,
visual, auditory etc. regions for preoperative
planning in neurosurgical operations. The
use of MSI for neurosurgery involves the in-
tegration of the functional MEG data with
the structural data from the magnetic reso-
nance imaging (MRI) modality to produce
magnetic source localization images that
show the precise inter-relationship between
the brain function and the structure. As a
concrete example of emerging clinical use,
the process of applying MSI in neurosurgery
practice was discussed in most interviews.
An overview of the work process of apply-
ing MSI in brain tumor surgery is presented
in Figure 2. It depicts the work process as an
anticipated, ideal model of the emerging
clinical service with MEG at the Institute.
Figure 2 aims to illuminate the two crucial
challenges of the implementation of the new
artifact within the established hospital set-
tings: integration of several new and already
standardized technologies, and integration
of various occupational groups into a collec-
tive practice.
12
Figure 2. The clinical work process of applying MEG (MSI) in brain tumor surgery at the
Institute in 1997 (an ideal model)
NMIN
2. Patient is taken in
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NMIN=New Mexico Institute of Neuroimaging at VA
VA= Veterans Affairs Hospital
UNM=University of New Mexico
OR=operation room
The applying of MSI involves four major
steps prior to the actual use at the operation
room in the hospital neurosurgery depart-
ment. (1) The referral of a surgical candidate
for functional brain mapping comes from a
hospital physician (typically from a neuro-
surgeon), and the Institute’s administrator
together with the MEG nurse set the MEG
outlines-2000.qxd  23-11-00  12:55  Side 12
and MRI measurement appointments for the
patient. (2) The patient is taken in to the
Institute and prepared for the measurements.
Within these phases, the MEG nurse may
negotiate with the referring doctor about the
MEG measurement protocol to be used in
the particular case. (3) The MEG measure-
ment and the MRI imaging are performed
with the patient. (4) The MEG data are ana-
lyzed and integrated with the MRI images of
the patient. These work actions at the In-
stitute were largely invisible for the refer-
ring physicians. Finally, if the neurosurgeon
still decides to operate on the patient, the lo-
calizing information is used for planning the
surgical approach, and taken to the opera-
tion room by plotting it in the imaging
workstation (frameless stereotactic system).
Depending on the urgency of the surgical
case, the entire process may be performed
within a week.
At the Institute, the practitioners involved
in the use of MEG were located in the same
area with the practitioners working with the
other imaging modalities. For instance, the
MEG technologists worked close together
with the MRI technologists in a small mea-
surement area devoted to the operation of
both MEG system and the MRI system. The
patient care related to the measurements
took place in this area as well. The scientists
had their separate office near the measure-
ment area. The MEG nurse and the intraop-
erative technician also stayed in a separate
office when preparing the imaging worksta-
tion for the operation. A partial layout of the
Institute with locations of the MEG practi-
tioners is presented in Figure 3.
13
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Figure 3. Partial layout of the Institute: Locations of MEG activities and practitioners and
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3. Transition process at the
Institute in 1997
In the following, I shall briefly describethe background and early phases of theInstitute to offer a better understanding
of the multi-layered nature of the specific
transitional phase analyzed in this paper.
The local history of MEG in the USA is
connected to the internationally emerging
relationship between radiology medicine
and industry in the overall development of
imaging technologies (Blume, 1992).
The Institute was officially established in
1993. A senior physician described the
agreement between the hospital and the
Biotechnologies Incorporation, which trans-
ferred the MEG unit under the control of
Radiology Department.
Because of the expense of this machine (…)
only Radiology had the money. So, they [the
company] made an agreement with us that if we
would make the director of the unit a radiologist
rather than a neurologist, they would then give us
the instrument (…) It was just a practical decisi-
on: without him (Doctor O.B., a radiologist) be-
coming the Director, we couldn’t have got the in-
strument. They [referring to the company] then
put a condition that (…) they wanted to control
two thirds of the time on the instrument (…) The
type of questions that they wanted to answer
were: How fast could a person go through the
machine? And they wanted to try to standardize
it so that anyone could use it, it didn’t take scien-
tists to run it, what we call a turnkey operation.
And instead of allowing investigators to develop
protocols specific to the population, they wanted
that everybody go through the same test.
(Interview with Doctor D.L. on July 8)
Under radiology specialty, the Institute was
developed as a multi-modality neuroimag-
ing facility, and the MEG program was ex-
panded to cover a wide variety of studies
with various patient groups. Together with a
new principal scientist hired to run the MEG
program, the director of the Institute built an
efficient model of producing MEG measure-
ments in the fashion that hospital laboratory
protocols typically require: efficiently,
quickly and with proper patient care. To a
large extent, the model followed the way the
MRI images are produced: for instance,
MRI technologists were trained to operate
the MEG system and perform measure-
ments with it.
One goal was just to get a survey of what MEG
might be able to see, a wide variety of patients,
and also to show that if you do run large numbers
of patients, MEG can be used in a kind of mass
production way (…) the same way MRI is: you
get someone in, you do the test, you analyze it,
and you do two or three a day. (…) (Interview
with researcher D.J., a neuroscientist, June 6)
The phase of intense development in apply-
ing MEG at the Institute is depicted in
Figure 4. During this growing phase, in
1993-1996, the principal neuroscientist,
without any previous experience in MEG,
took charge of the MEG program and be-
came a pioneer in applying, analyzing and
interpreting MEG data for clinical purposes.
He started, together with the facility director
mentioned above and a few neurosurgeons
from the local hospitals, applying functional
brain mapping in preoperative planning of
brain tumor patients. Toward the end of this
period, the supplier of the MEG system
changed, and a Finnish company, Neuro-
mag, supplied the first whole-head MEG
system to the Institute.
14
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During this period, the Institute produced a
major amount of patient measurements but a
limited number of scientific publications for
securing independent research funding.
From the founding of the Institute in 1993 to
1997, patient examinations included more
than 20 000 MRI and CT studies as well as
over 1300 clinical functional brain imaging
(MSI) studies. Since the installation of the
new whole-head MEG system in 1994 to
1997, 38 neurosurgical patients with brain
tumors and over 120 epilepsy patients had
been evaluated at the Institute. The evalua-
tion of the clinical applications for Federal
Drug Administration Office (FDA) approval
had been done previously for the old MEG
system, but was yet to be done for the new
system. The Institute was now facing a more
intense challenge of validating and sustain-
ing the new system in clinical work, and
also of reporting the findings to the scienti-
fic community.
The main application of MEG, the imple-
mentation of MSI in preoperative planning
of neurosurgical patients, was still in its ear-
ly stages in 1997 as the organizational situ-
ation at the Institute changed dramatically.
At the beginning of a new phase at the
Institute, challenged to move from the intro-
duction of clinical application to the adop-
tion and consolidation, the facility director
together with the principal MEG scientist
left the Institute to open a new neuroimag-
ing Center in another state in the USA. Part
of the MEG operating staff left the facility
as well to join the new Center. At the same
time, a few key collaborators and customers,
for instance, two neurosurgeons involved in
using functional brain mapping, left the sur-












































(Experimental) use of MSI
in neurosurgery
A few published “patient
case histories”
Figure 4. The phase of growth at the Institute in 1993-1996, modeled as an activity system
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lost the show-site status and the additional
funding connected to it, due to the newly es-
tablished Center being now more attractive
for the supplier firm’s customers. These crit-
ical organizational changes and the simulta-
neous challenge of sustaining the use of
MEG in neurosurgical practice comprise the
Institute’s transition examined in this paper.
4. Perceptions about the
transitions going on at the
Institute
In the following section, I shall examinehow the various practitioners involved inthe clinical use of MEG perceived6 the
transition at the Institute and in the broader
network. One might assume that perceptions
about such a dramatic change would be ho-
mogenous, one-sided and linear, obviously
emphasizing “the good old days” in this
case. It will be shown in the following that
this was not the case – or the whole picture
(for similar findings, see also Blackler,
Crump & McDonald, 1999).
How does the interview data reflect and
illustrate the complexity of the current tran-
sition at the Institute? In particular, are there
any indications about changing objects of
the implementation process of MEG? In
what way do perceptions highlight the anti-
cipated overall challenge of the innovation
process, the introduction and standardiza-
tion of MEG to clinical use?
From an activity-theoretical perspective,
implementation of new artifacts can be re-
garded as reconstruction and redefinition of
the object of activity, in and through specif-
ic situated actions. As organizational activi-
ty systems and their fields undergo transfor-
mations, they often redefine and expand
their objects. The dimensions of expansion
discussed above become salient in problem
situations and periods of intense change
(Engeström, R. Engeström & Vähäaho,
1999; Hasu, 2000).
In order to trace indications of change and
potential expansions of the object of the
practitioners, I analyzed the interview data
in the framework of the four dimensions of
expansion described in the introduction. For
the present analysis, I reformulated the cri-
teria presented by Engeström (2000) in three
ways. First, I included in the social-spatial
dimension also indications of physical-spa-
tial expansion, that is, other technical arti-
facts and systems (“who else should be in-
cluded, and what other artifacts/systems
should be considered?”). Second, in the an-
ticipatory-temporal dimension, I included
perceptions that indicated not only antici-
pated steps but also directions of possible
new approaches and foci of work (“what
previous and forthcoming steps, and poten-
tial new directions and approaches should
be considered?”). Third, in the systemic-de-
velopmental dimension, I included percep-
tions that emphasized the developmental as-
pect of artifacts (“how does this shape the
future of the activity, and how the artifacts
used in that activity should be developed or
transformed?”).
When transitioning from the early start-
up phase of the implementation toward the
phase of adoption and consolidation, expan-
sion of the object along the social-spatial di-
mension would typically imply that instead
of being regarded as an independent, isolat-
ed piece of technology (or operation), the
16
6 The notion of perception used here is related to the no-
tion of conception widely used in phenomenographic
studies of the different understandings of phenomena in
the world around us. The various understandings, con-
ceptions, are seen as experiential relations between the in-
dividual and the phenomenon (Marton, 1981). However, I
did not apply the phenomenographical strategy in which
a conception is categorized and abstracted from the ex-
pressions that are considered to reflect it. My interest was
to capture the variety and situatedness of the ways in
which the interviewees talked about the transition.
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artifact is constructed in its use contexts.
That includes other artifacts as well as vari-
ous organizational relations. The anticipato-
ry-temporal expansion would mean that in-
stead of being seen as a discrete, one-time
project or endeavor, the implementation is
constructed as a continuous, iterative pro-
cess involving various phases and levels of
activity. Moral-ideological expansion would
mean that instead of each individual user/
applier being responsible just for a specific
work task within implementation, all practi-
tioners involved take responsibility for the
entire implementation and adoption trajec-
tory. This implies also a reconsideration of
power relations: it is no longer automatical-
ly given that the highest ranking specialist
or the most experienced, advanced practi-
tioner alone has absolute power and respon-
sibility to determine the course of the imple-
mentation and adoption. The systemic-de-
velopmental expansion would mean that in-
stead of actions being seen only as influen-
cing the given local context of implementa-
tion, they are also seen as shaping the
broader development of the technology and
its adopter practices.
Clearly articulated expansions may not be
the only way of dealing with transition and
change. Transition is contradictory, and the
anticipated expansions may collide with
conditions that keep remaining the same in a
given organization. I assume that there are
not only clear-cut, concise perceptions about
transition, but also – in the form of dilem-
matic speech (Billig & al., 1988) – unclear,
emerging attempts to make sense of the past
and of what is presently going on.
I included in the analysis the interviews
of those participants who had been involved
in the implementation and clinical use of
MEG for over one year. The collaborating
clinicians such as, for instance, the main
neurosurgeon and the main collaborating
neurologist from the UNM hospital, did not
present interpretations about inner work dy-
namics or specific division of labor of the
Institute. Each clinician had been identified
as a possible collaborator by the former
leaders (“They identified me as someone
who might be interested in MEG”) and each
clinician co-operated with the Institute indi-
vidually. For them, transition meant only a
change in directorship that had “not changed
the affiliation” of co-operation. They were
doing “their part of the deal” with MEG
people and their main interests were focused
on their own medical practice such as treat-
ment of epilepsy patients or neurosurgical
patients, or their own individual research
projects. In a way, they looked at MEG from
a distance: they seemed to be interested but
not deeply involved in it.
Respectively, the technologists responsi-
ble for the operation of the MEG system and
measurements at the Institute mainly dealt
with problems and challenges pertaining to
the operation of the system and also to the
division of labor and collaboration on the
organizational level. They had only seldom
communicated with the clinicians and had
not even once visited the operation room to
see how MSI results were being used. Al-
though expressing concerns and worries
about the future development of MEG at the
Institute and about their own work situation,
they had a positive and hopeful perception
about the direction of transition that they as-
sumed to be happening. They also expressed
their feelings about the preceding phase and
the Institute’s people (“I hope we can di-
vorce ourselves from N.N.”).
To a large extent, the neuroscientists dealt
with the organizational context and the
broader network. The MEG scientist cur-
rently responsible for data analysis did co-
operate with some of the hospital clinicians
but he had not visited the operation room
when MSI results had been applied. The for-
mer principal MEG scientist, together with
17
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the former Director, had established and
participated in co-operation in applying
MEG in the operation room, but his con-
cerns touched no longer the Institute or local
collaborators. Starting a new MEG site had
brought in acute concerns about objectives
and division of labor within the supplier net-
work and other sites. Respectively, the new
facility director was only beginning to work
on his manifold duties within the local me-
dical community. Both the former and the
present MEG scientist expressed concerns
about the preceding and future directions of
the Institute and about the overall develop-
ment of the MEG “field.”
To sum up, each practitioner group seem-
ed to have a specific and partial point of
view, and different motives and concerns to-
ward the transitional process of the MEG
work at the Institute and the related network.
The local community involved in applying
MEG can be seen as consisting of several
loosely coupled activity systems, with dif-
ferent objects and tools, and especially, as
observation of the everyday activities at the
Institute showed, also different places and
schedules of work.
It is obvious that the collaborating clini-
cians at the local hospitals, working with the
treatment of neurological patients, formed a
separate system with a standardized and sta-
ble work community, rules and division of
labor different from those of the Institute. It
is interesting that within the Institute’s ac-
tivity system, for instance, the MEG tech-
nologists seemed to form a clearly distinct
team or “sub-culture,” centering their work
actions around MEG measurements, placing
their work spatially and permanently on the
measurement area, and limiting their work-
ing time strictly to the office hours. The sci-
entists, working primarily with data analy-
sis, formed another separate sub-group, stay-
ing mainly in the analysis laboratory and
working late in the evenings. The technolo-
gists and the scientists did not, for instance,
take their lunch or coffee breaks together.
The MSI nurse and the imaging technician,
working together on the preparation and dis-
play of images for surgery, also formed a
separate team shuttling between the Institute
and the surgery departments. They also had
their lunch and did sports together. The
nurse worked also in the measurement area
taking care of surgical candidates coming in
for MEG and MRI scanning, and when there
was a need, for instance, to sedate child pa-
tients.
A few individual practitioners seemed to
be affected more than others by the organi-
zational changes of the Institute taking place
simultaneously with the transition to the
adoption and consolidation phase of apply-
ing MEG. One of them was the MEG scien-
tist responsible for clinical data analysis and
interpretation. Also the MSI nurse and the
imaging technician, as well as the principal
technologist responsible for the MEG sys-
tem were deeply engaged in the ongoing
transition.
Especially two of the four dimensions of
expansion, the anticipatory-temporal and
the moral-ideological dimension, proved to
be illuminating when applied to the inter-
view data. Perceptions about transition cate-
gorized with the help of these dimensions
indicated emerging changes in the object of
implementation. Among all practitioner
groups and along all four dimensions of ex-
pansion, especially one concern continued
showing up in the data. That was the con-
straint of isolated individual expertise and
responsibility in applying MEG, with a si-
multaneous challenge of sustaining MEG in
clinical use. I shall examine in more detail
how these concerns emerged within the four
dimensions and how they reflected the pre-
sent challenges of sustainability and stan-
dardization of MEG.
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5. Social-spatial dimension
Expansion along the social-spatial di-mension of the object can best be il-lustrated in the situation of the MEG
technologists. The desired expansion of the
work object, participation in data analysis,
was expressed by all the three technologists.
They mentioned having their measurement
work temporarily scaled down since the de-
parture of the former facility director and
principal MEG investigator. This can also be
seen in the laboratory log as there was a pe-
riod of a few days without any measure-
ments at all. There seemed to be a natural
motive to find something to do on such
days. In addition, data reading had become a
veritable bottleneck, as there was only one
scientist engaged in it.
The principal MEG technologist came to
associate the separated work on measure-
ments and the spatial layout of the laborato-
ry with what prevented encounters between
the technologists operating the MEG sys-
tem, on the one hand, and the scientists do-
ing the data reading, on the other. The prin-
cipal technologist related the importance of
information about the quality of the mea-
surement event to the quality of the data
analysis. As a supervisor of his colleagues
who were engaged in the actual patient mea-
surements, he had a perspective both on data
collection (in measurement area) and on
data review (taking place in the analysis lab-
oratory) prior to actual analysis and inter-
pretation done by the MEG scientist.
Excerpt 1
Interviewer: Do you like it [division of labor in pro-
ducing MSI results] this way? Are you, in a way,
content with this division of activities?
Technologist 1: I think the layout of the site could be
a little different. Having a divided area between
where the data is collected and the data is analyzed
is actually a weakness, because it tends to separate
the group a little bit, and I think it’s a good collec-
tive force to stay together all the time. I’d like to be
around hearing more of the data analysis discussion.
I’ve overheard discussion that gets created on the
data analysis side, and I’ve overheard discussion that
gets created on the scanning side, that is contrived
and is sometimes not true. (…) For example, I’ve
heard where a data set gets reviewed and I just can-
not explain why for example a particular dipole
seems to be in the wrong place, and… well, the pa-
tient must have moved, and there was never an at-
tempt to follow up and see if this really happened…
Excerpt 1, centering around a wish to “be
around hearing more of the data analysis dis-
cussion,” indicates also responsibility over
the boundary between the two functional
work tasks, the data gathering and the data
analysis. It highlights the expansion of object
from merely performing measurements to-
ward concern over each data production and
analysis cycle. The systemic conditions of
the MEG technologists’ transitional situation
may be summarized with the help of Figure
5, depicting contradictions of the activity sys-
tem of the technologists participating in the
application of MEG. The expansive perspec-
tive is explicit in the object, outcome, com-
munity and division of labor in Figure 5.
However, the expansion of technologists’
work to include data analysis is inherently
contradictory. The present state of data
analysis and clinical interpretation still re-
quired, as one scientist stated, “too much
subjective interpretation,” being a process of
several years’ apprenticeship learning for
the few neuroscientists engaged in it. Also
the rules concerning payroll and work time
among technologists and scientists were dif-
ferent. Much of the data reading was done
late in the evenings. For the technologists to
engage in data analysis work with routine
radiology experience and regular office
hours was problematic, to say the least. The
lightning-shaped two-headed arrows be-
tween the tools and the object, and between
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The MRI scientist touched upon a possible
resolution to these contradictions as he
stressed the possibility to reduce the level of
subjective training and experience by devel-
oping new analysis software. He did not see
the long “learning curve” for analysis work
as an obligatory passage point, an inevitable
rule, in the implementation and adoption of
MEG.
Excerpt 2
One of the big problems (…) is the way the technol-
ogy is currently implemented, in that it requires a lot
of subjective interpretation, and I really think the
analysis processing and the response identification
is gonna be really improved algorithmically to re-
duce the level of subjective training and experience
that is required. I think the current way it’s imple-
mented really puts an unnecessary emphasis on a lot
of experience in reading these types of things
where... I think it can be done better, so that you
don’t have to have such a long learning curve to get
up. (…) There’s certainly lots of opportunity for au-
tomation and the data analysis and data preproces-
sing – even in the supervised sense – it doesn’t have
to be totally automatic, we just... a way of helping
manage the complexity. (Scientist 2)
Integration of technologies as a central pre-
condition in the implementation of MEG
was also taken up in the interviews. Appli-
cation and use of multi-modality imaging
was part of the mission and also an area of
expertise of the Institute. The history of
MEG at the Institute consists largely of de-
velopment and application of data inter-
change, integration and display between the
MEG and MRI systems. Display of integra-
ted images and their use for image-guided
surgery in the operation room had required
adoption of special systems, e.g., frameless
stereotactic workstation, which was in a de-
velopmental phase and being tested at the
Institute. This work had started at the In-
stitute already in the 1980s before the Di-
com data interchange (transfer) protocol be-
came standard in the systems.
For a collaborating clinician who had fol-
lowed the MEG work at the Institute ever
since its inception, the starting point for any
communication about the possibilities of
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From measurement work and
data analysis work
treated separately and located in
separate spaces to both
integrated and located in the same space
OUTCOME:
From measurement under control to
integrated data gathering and analysis
process under control
Figure 5. Systemic conditions of transitional situation for MEG technologists at the
Institute in 1997
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image: functional location provided by
MEG as related to the anatomy of the brain.
Excerpt 3
(…) even though radiologists have more physics be-
cause of the x-rays – nothing close to MEG – and
even though they were located here, you don’t see a
radiologist come near, except occasionally someone
like L.R and O.B. A majority of them don’t wanna
even come near this place, because it’s so weird. To
a radiologist the picture is everything. So, if we did-
n’t come up with putting the location on to the MRI,
we would’ve gotten nowhere. (Clinician 2)
According to an MRI scientist, an architect
of technology integration at the Institute, the
ongoing challenges included automated data
analysis processing (e.g., development and
acquisition of improved analysis software)
on the side of data production, and display
and use of the data (e.g., development and
use of imaging workstation and software)
for surgical operations. Accuracy of the pro-
cess was still a major ongoing concern. A
picture of implementing the technology lo-
cally as a continuous process of including
and improving artifacts and their use prac-
tices emerged in the interview. Improvement
of artifacts and processes will need develop-
ment work both in the local setting and
among technology suppliers.
Excerpt 4
There are a couple of questions that are interrelated:
certainly there’s a big issue on the display and use of
the data. How to properly display the results for re-
ferring physicians and, and how to use the results in
our surgical systems are an ongoing issue, how best
to represent the values that are provided, and I think
that there’s quite a lot of room for improvement on
that given the current practices. The other main issue
that I see is one of accuracy of the process, and is-
sues that are doubt with anybody who works with
multiple data sets or physical patient (…) How to
quantify the accuracy and present that accuracy to
the users. (…) Currently (…) there’s no assessment
of anything of the uncertainty of that location, which
I think is very important for physicians’ interpreta-
tion. So, those are the two general categories that I
think are ongoing and still should be. (Scientist 2)
As excerpt 4 illustrates, implementation of
new technology and its application is seen
as an ongoing, mundane problem solving
process with continuous improvement of
various technical systems and their combi-
nations.
These findings are in line with the social-
spatial dimension of expansion discussed in
section 4. In addition to social relations,
practitioners expressed a need to expand the
object of implementation spatially and phy-
sically. The MEG technologists desired to
enlarge their work description and become
included in the data analysis work which
had become a veritable bottleneck at the
Institute. Continuous improvement of arti-
facts and systems was expanded to cover
also the improvement of practices of using
those systems. This idea of continuity and
mundane, iterative work in integrating and
improving artifacts and use practices im-
plies also the anticipatory-temporal expan-
sion of the object among the practitioners.
6. Anticipatory-temporal
dimension
Interestingly enough, perceptions aboutthe preceding focus of the Institute var-ied among the interviewed. The idea
about the priority of the Institute in some
cases varied or contradicted even among an
individual practitioner. For the technolo-
gists, the former focus of the Institute was
neuroscience: “developing neuroscience pro-
gram as opposed to a clinical MEG pro-
gram” (technologist 1) or “program has been
oriented around neuropsychology at the ex-
pense of clinical program” (technologist 3).
On the other hand, the way that “doing sci-
ence” appeared to the technologists seemed
to contradict the typical notion held about
21
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science (“we never … do the very basics”,
technologist 2). That the priorities of the
Institute were somewhat unclear or dilem-
matic for the technologists, supports the
finding of a discrete character of their work
discussed above. It can also indicate the
multiple – and potentially contradictory –
objects of the Institute not clearly articulat-
ed and made visible among the various
groups of the organization.
The excerpt below illustrates the expan-
sion of a technologist’s object along the an-
ticipatory-temporal dimension. The antici-
pated work objective will no longer be an
isolated measurement operation, but, in-
stead, the re-examining of the entire process
from measurement to utilization of the re-
sults. This is also seen as a collective effort
(recall the expression “as a group” occurring
twice in the excerpt 5). It implicitly presup-
poses continuity, that is, a project or a de-
velopmental trajectory set up jointly. Re-
duction of the personnel time used in the
process is connected to the reduction of
costs of the service, enhancing the availabi-
lity of service for patients and their insur-
ance companies.
Excerpt 5
Interviewer: What will be the main focus in the near
future – in your opinion?
Technologist 1: What I believe we need to do right
now as a group, is to closely examine all the steps of
the process, and then as a group decide, with input
from the clinicians, what we really need to answer
for them... and that’s where I believe we’re heading
right now... (…) I think it’s getting – this machine –
on a track of a clinical program so that the exam
could be done in a timely fashion. The expense of
MEG right now to the patient is very high, because
of the time involved in data collecting and then even
more specifically, the analysis time. If we can re-
duce the cost to the patient, that will be beneficial to
the patient, the insurance company, and the only
way we can reduce the cost is to spend less person-
nel time on this process.
For the neuroscientists working full-time at
the Institute, the past work at the Institute
centered around the notions of “mass pro-
duction” and “bootstrap mode”. The antici-
pated work approach needed to be moving
toward a more “long-term scientific ap-
proach” and “scientific rigor”. Still, the past
approach was not seen as merely negative: it
was seen as an indispensable phase of de-
velopment, a necessity “to get it going”.
They addressed the present need to identify
or re-direct the guiding research problems in
order to produce publishable results. To
achieve this kind of goals would require an
“ongoing program of investigation,” that is,
expansion of temporal dimension of the ob-
ject from short-term, preliminary studies to-
ward long-term, hypothesis-driven investi-
gation.
Excerpt 6
Clearly Doctor O.B. did an amazing job of boot-
strapping this place and getting it going, and that
was based on an approach to technology and how
you sell it and push it forward. The facility, though,
has also matured quite a lot – instead of being in a
bootstrap mode we are at an operational mode, and
transition makes it extremely useful that we’ve had
a difference in directorship at the facility. And that
has allowed us to move from fairly early preliminary
introduction type of work to an ongoing program of
investigation that has scientific rigor. (Scientist 2)
The physician-researcher who had followed
the MEG work at the Institute since its be-
ginning advocated connecting the Institute’s
future approach to already existing ap-
proaches and research questions in the field
as a prerequisite for research collaboration
between sites.
Excerpt 7
We sort of have to start and get a scientific footing.
Working under doctor O.B’s regime, we produced a
lot of work and limited publications. I don’t neces-
sarily say we’re alone – but that winds up in some
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funny ways slowing down the credibility of a field.
Doctor L.R., he comes out of a Ph.D. type back-
ground, he is very much of a hypothesis-driven sci-
entist, and I think clearly intends to change how we
do business here. So, we will be parallel with the
Finland group and other groups. That makes it a lot
easier for collaborations to occur, because you’re
doing the same types of things. Once you’ve agreed
upon a same study protocol, you both can do it.
(Clinician 2)
The tension-laden and in various ways con-
tradictory situation related to the anticipato-
ry-temporal expansion of object is perhaps
best illuminated in an interview with the
neuroscientist currently responsible for
MEG data reading. He had been deeply in-
volved in the preceding era of the MEG
work at the Institute, being trained as a data
analyst by the principal MEG scientist who
had now left the facility. He was literally liv-
ing between two worlds and seemed to vac-
illate between which one to step in. On the
other hand, he did see the dilemmas of the
former approach: not enough specific focus,
not enough publications to attract indepen-
dent research funding.
Excerpt 8
Interviewer: How would you describe the transition
process you are living through at the Institute with
MEG right now?
Scientist 1: First, I have to say something about what
happened before they [the former facility director
and principal MEG scientist] left, so you can under-
stand what we’re transitioning from. So… Doctor
O.B.’s goal was to run as many patients of every
kind as possible, and in the process succeeded two
things. (…) First of all, we had a lot of case histories
that were very interesting that showed the value of
MEG. We did show that MEG could be used on a
very rapid turnaround basis. It also made a number
of people unhappy in that the workload didn’t allow
us to turn out papers, and, they felt like research was
probably the primary thing that we should be doing.
And also it didn’t allow us to focus on any specific
issues. (…). So when Doctor L.R. came in, they de-
cided to have strict criteria for specific studies, and
have some of them be clinical studies and some of
them basic science studies, but in any case, whatev-
er kind of study it was, there would be two kinds of
patients or subjects: there would be those patients
for whom there’s an already defined value for the
use of MEG, like tumor patients... All the other cat-
egories of patients are more under clinical research
in that we need to find out what we can do for these
kinds of patients.
The ongoing transitions had made the al-
ready laborious work with data reading even
more intense for the scientist, as he was the
only one doing clinical interpretation of data
at the site. He was stressed out, and he told
that he was coping on a day to day basis, un-
able to think of the whole process, or how to
improve the way things were. He had also
started to consider joining the group that had
left the site.
Excerpt 9
Interviewer: What is your special area now here in
this Institute?
Scientist 1: (laughs) I would say I’m on everybody’s
area right now. I am involved in virtually every study
that involves the MEG. By necessity I become in-
volved in it. And since I’m involved in everyone of
those and do the clinical reading... So, if it’s a clini-
cal analysis, I do probably 99 per cent of that. I
should be doing other reading as well, for research.
I don’t actually end up doing those analyses, be-
cause I just don’t have the time.
Given that the neuroscientist’s time was
completely consumed in clinical reading,
the anticipated expansion of object involv-
ing a long-term, hypothesis-driven research
and publishing was inherently contradictory
for him. The systemic conditions of the
MEG scientist’s transitional situation may
be summarized with the help of figure 6.
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In the course of the interview, the scientist
touched several times upon the dilemma of
combining research work and applied work
with scarce resources and personnel. The
same constraint appeared also in the inter-
view of the neuroscientist formerly respon-
sible for the MEG program at the Institute.
He had at first done all the data reading by
himself, working hundred-hour weeks
demonstrating MSI to neurosurgeons. Now
the same situation was reoccurring. A con-
tradiction emerged between the anticipated
object of long-term research and the divi-
sion of labor based on solo performance
and solo expertise in data analysis. The
lightning-shaped two-headed arrow in
Figure 6 depicts this crucial tension. Still,
research was supposed to be the future focus
of the Institute.
Excerpt 10
Interviewer: And what do you think, has the focus of
work changed, or will it change now when the new
facility director has started?
Scientist 1: So, his [Director’s] approach to getting
support and to becoming a major site is to develop
research work. That’s gonna take a long-term com-
mitment, it needs people who, who do research...
Interviewer: Has he said it?
Scientist 1: Yeah, he has. He’s... stated this as a... as
a plan. His goal is to develop basic and clinical re-
search at this site. And, the problems with that are
what I just discussed… that nobody has time to ac-
tually do that research.
Although the idea about the past era of the
Institute varied among the interviewees,
most of the practitioners clearly advocated
transition at the Institute – changes in the
priorities of work, more scientific focus, and
more long-term approach concerning the
development and applying of MEG. These
findings indicate anticipatory-temporal ex-
pansion in the object of implementation that
is in line with the Institute’s emerging chal-
lenge of moving from the introductory
phase of the implementation toward estab-
lishing the use of MEG in the local commu-
nity. However, this expansion turned out to
be constrained and problematic. The desired
anticipatory-temporal expansion did not
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solo responsibility in data
reading
OUTCOME:
From “production” of images
under control to scientific
publications under control
Figure 6. Systemic conditions of the transitional situation for the MEG scientist responsible
for data reading at the Institute in 1997
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correspond with the prevailing division of
labor and resources at the Institute, causing
solo performance and solo expertise to con-
tinue in the data analysis. Development of
more collectively mastered expertise and
standardized tools in the analysis and clini-
cal interpretation can be seen as critical and
constitutive to long-term success of the tran-
sition. Current challenge of the transition
may require – as a first step – exploring the




How, then, is the collective expertiseand responsibility of using a new ar-tifact acquired? What seems to hin-
der the collective mastery of the artifact use?
Before turning to these questions, it is essen-
tial to look at the interpretations that the for-
mer principal scientist of the MEG program
gave to problems and to his decision to leave
the Institute. This scientist, a pioneer and one
of the leading figures in clinical MEG, de-
scribed the problems in the following way:
Excerpt 11
There were a couple of things that I feel went wrong
here. The first of those (…) in the VA system, it is
extremely difficult to advance personnel. So, I had
been promised a raise, before I even took the job.
(…). Well, four years later they still had not solved
that problem. I was working hundred-hour weeks
getting, you know, it work out to five dollars an hour
or something (laughs). Another issue was (…) my
feeling was always that Radiology as a department
was happy to have MEG, it was something new and
exiting, but there was never any real commitment, if
MEG vanished tomorrow, nobody was going to be
disappointed. (…) And I didn’t like being the under-
appreciated guest. (…) One other issue... that I
didn’t like here is that the staff is not my staff. The
graduate students like D.J. and E.C., they were my
people. I trained them to read MEG, and the dyna-
mics of my relationship with them were very diffe-
rent from the dynamics of my relationship with the
others who were not chosen by me, so their loyalty
and their guidance was very difficult... (Scientist 3)
In the excerpt above, the problems were de-
scribed in three organizational contexts: in
the overall hospital “system” (shortage of
resources and personnel), in the radiology
department (shortage of commitment and
appreciation) and, finally, in the Institute
(problems with loyalty/performance of per-
sonnel). It can be argued that these issues
are typical and obvious problems of the im-
plementation of radically new technologies
that have to struggle to get themselves a
“place” and the organizations’ commitment
in already competitive environments (Leo-
nard, 1998).
As excerpt 11 highlights, to be able to get
even partial commitment and resources
from the organizations, a broker is needed to
take the first steps with a new and often un-
finished artifact. Typically, it involves a
huge amount of individual learning, self-
sacrificing work (“hundred-hour weeks”)
and personal commitment. Oftentimes work
with the artifact becomes a life project for
the pioneer developers and users of the new
technology, and, a matter of complex per-
sonal affection and possession of the arti-
fact, co-workers and expertise involved
(Latour, 1996; Engeström & Escalante,
1996). Excerpt 11 interestingly highlights
this kind of affectionate and possessive per-
ception toward the endeavor (the words ‘I’,
‘me’ or ‘my’ appear 12 times in excerpt 11).
It can be assumed that affectionate percep-
tions can also have a negative side in the im-
plementation process by maintaining per-
sonified and individualistic strategies to-
ward implementation objectives and imple-
mentation related problem solving (e.g.,
Leonard, 1998; Engeström & Escalante,
1996).
This question came out also in the inter-
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views as hints toward “strong personalities”
or “big eagles” involved in MEG. It seemed
that the data analysis expertise was some-
thing very much unknown among the tech-
nologists. It was perceived as something that
was kept aside and private by the person in-
volved in the analysis. This kind of individ-
ual, solo expertise – accepted as an unwrit-
ten rule – was strongly questioned by one of
the MEG technologist:
Excerpt 12
The system should stand on its own merits. Almost
anyone should be able to look at it and analyze it and
from the data alone – no eagles, no finessing. The
answer should be able to come out. It’s unfortunate
that anyone should suggest that only they can pro-
vide the answer from the data. I don’t feel that that’s
objective, and that’s clinical or that it’s beneficial to
the program or the patients or all the people in-
volved. (Technologist 3)
The technologists felt that during the “past
era” of the Institute they were not supposed
to question things or to be interested in du-
ties other than those given to them. The tran-
sition going on at the Institute had made
them re-consider this assumption and their
own role in the data processing.
Excerpt 13
Interviewer: Do you like your work this way, or…
do you see your work is changing somehow?
Technologist 2: (…) We’ve been really trying to
make us a part. In the past we haven’t been as ag-
gressive in the data analysis, and I think sometimes
the data that we collected suffered, because: “Why
do we have to do it like this?” Nobody would ex-
plain why, it didn’t make any sense. But when you
have an opportunity to see the whole picture, you
start understanding: the head must be very still... the
head must be in this position... you know on and on
and on, and it makes more sense. I just think that the
more everybody knows the better exam your patient
is gonna have. And we sort of are getting towards
that point now...
Excerpt 14
Interviewer: How do you think... how these current
changes have affected to your own work?
Technologist 1: It’s forced me for the benefit – and
all of our group – to look closer at each case: how
we’re doing, what we’re doing and why we’re doing
these things. Many, many things that have been done
in the past were done that way because we were told
this is the way to do it, and that’s acceptable, but
now there’s questions: -“Why are we doing it that
way? Is there a better way?” Not saying that that was
the wrong way in the first place, but we’re just look-
ing at things closer… and I think that has helped ac-
tually, because we’re all learning still what this ma-
chine can, can do for us...
The technologists now seemed to be ques-
tioning their uninformed position and advo-
cating participation in sense making activi-
ties in the work process (“trying to make us
a part”). Going beyond performing work
without knowing the purpose of each work
action, they wanted to see themselves as
subjects getting answers also to the why-
questions. Making sense of the entire
process was connected to the quality of par-
ticular work actions and reliability of end-
results, for instance, digitizing patient’s
head position indicators prior to measure-
ment. An intention of becoming knowledge-
able over the work process indicates emerg-
ing collective perspective and collective re-
sponsibility, and, respectively, expansion on
the moral-ideological dimension of the ob-
ject.
The constraints of individual expertise
and responsibility in data analysis were best
illumined in the interview with the neurosci-
entist and current MEG analyst of the
Institute. He faced the time pressure and
question of reliability of the results daily
when interpreting data for clinical use. For
instance, data analysis of functional loca-
tions of the brain for a surgical candidate re-
quired approximately one 10-hour day per
each patient, sometimes even more, depend-
ing on the complexity of the case. Although
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aided by a special analysis program, the
analysis especially for surgical candidates
required intense and time-consuming read-
ing of the signals.7 It is not surprising that
the problem of individual expertise in data
analysis was a major concern of the analyst.
Excerpt 15
Interviewer: What problems do you have in mind –
in this current transition process using MEG clini-
cally?
Scientist 1: I guess foremost in my mind are two in-
terrelated problems. One is, that there need to be a
number of people trained to use MEG so that when
a site comes up or when a site loses somebody, they
aren’t faced immediately with the... prospect of
shutting down and not doing anything because they
don’t have someone who can interpret data.
The above excerpt shows that the scientist
was, first of all, concerned about the small
number of people capable of data analysis
and clinical interpretation in the current sit-
uation where new sites were being estab-
lished. For him, the training of MEG readers
was an urgent issue, as he was considering
leaving the facility himself. However, train-
ing data analysts as such was not the main
problem, but, rather, the question of the con-
tent of that training. The lack of shared rules
(“the field” mentioned in excerpt 16), among
MEG scientists working at different sites,
for discriminating between normal and ab-
normal findings, was of serious concern to
the scientist. The current rule of data analy-
sis described by him as “a rule onto himself”
(excerpt 16) indicated isolated individual
mastery in data analysis and clinical inter-
pretation, and, at the same time, problems in
the standardization and broadening of the
clinical use of MEG.
Excerpt 16
The other problem is that the interpretation of the
MEG at a clinical level is not at all standardized at
this point. There’s so few people that each person
who does it is kind of a rule onto himself. There’s no
school out of which all MEGers come, so that
there’s an accepted belief about how to deal with
certain things in the field – there is no field! There
are the individuals who do it, and each of those in-
dividuals thinks that he does it the best way... and he
will instruct the person after him to do it that same
way, and, regardless of whether or not that is done
accurately, and whether or not the results are good.
It’s hard to trust that kind of environment. (…) at
some point there needs to be created a field where
the people who know it stop arguing, get together
and say: “we’ve gotta train people.” There’re a lot of
cutting edge questions what we all argue about, what
means what, but we need to decide on some basic
center ground, where everybody can say: “– Oh, I
think I believe that enough so that we can depend on
that in surgery or we can depend on that in epilep-
sy,” and so everybody will do that. So, I think it’s a
combined problem: there’s not enough people and
there’s consequently not any standardized way of
dealing with MEG research or clinical work.
(Scientist 1)
Here, the scientist pointed out a crucial
question: the reliability (“accuracy”, “trust”)
of the results of the MEG at the clinical lev-
el. He advocated a shift in clinical interpre-
tation from isolated individual mastery to-
ward collective expertise through negotiated
rules of interpretation, that is, a “basic cen-
ter ground,” among the people involved in
analyzing MEG data. He also appealed to
the maturity of those people (to “stop argu-
ing”) as a condition for collaboration to oc-
cur, illustrating the present competitive and
constrained relations within the community.
The emerging collective responsibility over
the clinical reliability of MEG, as perceived
by the scientist, indicates expansion in the
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7 The data analysis in functional brain mapping for
surgery requires localizing the sources of the evoked re-
sponses, for instance, somatosensory, visual, auditory sig-
nals. In some cases, determining the right or the most ob-
vious source location is a complex task. Analysis and lo-
cation of epileptic seizures requires careful reading of
data of the continuous brain activity in order to identify
epileptiform brain activity (spikes) from the signals.
outlines-2000.qxd  23-11-00  12:55  Side 27
Mervi Hasu: Blind Men and the Elephant
moral-ideological dimension of the object
of implementation. The creation of expertise
and “best practice” in data analysis should
no longer be based on isolated researchers’
individual efforts, but, instead, on the joint
effort of those involved.
The anticipated expansion of joint work
centering around the clinical use of MEG
appeared inherently contradictory from the
perspective of an individual scientist, who
gradually becomes involved in an unknown
domain intermixed with diverse interests of
the scientific community, medical practices,
and the industry. Research work becomes a
series of compromises enforced by “reali-
ties” such as economical survival.
Excerpt 17
Scientist 1: This brings up another thought that I
keep having about this (…) starting with basic sci-
entist (…) So, the first step, I come to MEG: it looks
promising, I do things that those people [who have
the money] are interested in. That’s just the first
compromise, then you start seeing how delicately
balanced the survival of MEG is. And so you say to
yourself: -“Okay, now I have to make my main re-
search goal, the hypothesis that MEG is clinically
useful, and I need to prove that.” And that’s inter-
mixed into all of the basic science research that I’m
interested in doing, and it’s hard to distinguish a
completely basic science research question from one
that’s gonna prove that MEG is useful... (…) can
you even assure yourself that you’re being com-
pletely objective about your research... because
you’re so focused, and your own financial survival is
dependent on showing how useful and how mean-
ingful all of this research is that you can no longer
say: -“No, this was totally useless for this or that
purpose”. You can’t write that paper, right?
Interviewer: No, you can’t do that…
Scientist 1: If I try to write that sentence...my pen
blots.
Interviewer: Yes. It’s a construction process in a
way... you construct that value.
Scientist 1: Yeah, exactly. It was... it was interesting
and now I have to prove it’s useful too. That’s exact-
ly... you construct the value.
Excerpt 17 illustrates the contradiction be-
tween the individually perceived rules of in-
dependent and objective scientific research
and the unwritten rules of the preceding
phase of the Institute, presupposed to serve
a multiplicity of interests and being eco-
nomically dependent on the support of the
vendor firm. An individual researcher, as a
member of the community, becomes en-
gaged in constructing the clinical value of
the technology, whether or not he or she is
interested in doing that in the first place.
The tensions involved in isolated individ-
ual performance on MEG and the responsi-
bility of spreading the user expertise within
the community were not restricted to data
analysis only. There was only one dedicated
neurosurgeon left in the community, in the
summer of 1997, engaged in applying and
developing the use of MSI in the operations.
The transitional, and in various ways contra-
dictory work situation in applying MSI in
the operation room was illuminated in the
interviews with the MSI nurse and the intra-
operative technician. They were the ones
who took the imaging workstation to the
operation room and operated it during a neu-
rosurgical operation, and in this way provid-
ed the actual multi-modality imaging infor-
mation for the surgeons.
Working in the operation room with neu-
rosurgeons8 and nursing staff was a source
of distress for the MSI nurse and the techni-
cian. Their words, “everybody is fighting for
space in OR,” show the friction against
bringing a new piece of equipment into an
already crowded space. Sometimes they
were required to compromise and place the
28
8 Typically, several physicians (at least two assisting sur-
geons in addition to the main surgeon) operate in a neu-
rosurgical operation such as tumor surgery. In the present
setting, the neurosurgeons from the local hospitals
formed a surgeon pool, distributing operations among
themselves.
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imaging workstation and other equipment in
positions that were not optimal for the func-
tioning of the stereotactic camera system.
The hierarchical work organization, headed
by high-ranking surgeons, was another
source of tensions for the team. With the
equipment incomprehensible to most of the
operation room’s staff, they often felt like
lowest ranking practitioners and unwanted
intruders in the operation room.
Excerpt 18
Interviewer: What are the typical problems that you
have had in the operation room with this worksta-
tion?
Technician: I’d say a lack of understanding how the
equipment works, and what to do and not to do with
it to make it work more efficiently by nursing staff
and doctors. People bumping into the camera... (…)
then because we’re the test site for the software for
all of the newest stuff, we’ve had problems with the
software that we have to get around and then report
them in and have them fixed then, so... (…) Any
time you add another piece of equipment to an al-
ready crowded room people get worried that they’re
not going to be able to work as effectively...
Excerpt 19
Interviewer: How do you feel about working with
the surgeons? Is it easy to work with them?
Nurse: (laughs) It’s terrible. (…) There’s a... there’s
often times when ego gets associated, with being a
neurosurgeon I think. You don’t see that with Doctor
B.N., and really you don’t see with a lot of people
that are here now. One of the surgeons we used to
work with, he was pretty hard to get along with.
He’s a kind of guy that yells at you, throws stuff and
things like that, and I think it goes just with the...
with the territory, he’s egotistical and... you see that.
As the above excerpts show, integrating a
new technical artifact and method still at
their testing phase to an established work
practice can be constrained by problems and
hostility of early users unable to understand
and to rely on them. The surgeon’s yelling
and hurling things around, described by the
nurse, may be interpreted as a sign of arro-
gance and impatience associated with the
powerful position of the surgeon, or, on the
other hand, as a sign of frustration with the
technology incomprehensible for the sur-
geon.
The MSI nurse and the imaging techni-
cian were working concretely at the inter-
face between the new technology develop-
ment and its potential adopter community,
the local neurosurgery practice. In a way,
they were having a dual object: testing new
software for the intraoperative imaging
workstation, on the one hand, and assisting
surgeons with their operating, on the other.
In many cases, these two tasks were suc-
cessfully performed simultaneously. Due to
the complex technology and environment,
problems with the technology still at its test
phase easily took the main role and became
the object of activity for the intraoperative
team. This, in turn, did not enhance reliance
on the technology by the surgeons and the
nursing staff. The transitional situation of
the intraoperative team may be summarized
with the help of Figure 7, describing the
contradictions of the activity system of the
team in applying MEG. The lightning-
shaped two-headed arrow between the rules
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During the ongoing transition at the
Institute, collaboration in the development
and application of MEG in neurosurgery
rested on a single neurosurgeon, doctor
B.N., from the VA hospital. As revealed in
the interview with the MSI nurse, one of
their common concerns was reliance on the
MSI results by the other surgeons in the lo-
cal hospitals. As shown above, the question
of reliability of the end-results of MSI was
an ongoing concern for the scientists work-
ing closely with data analysis and integra-
tion of MEG and MRI information. For the
nurse who had several times seen how the
results had been actually used in the OR, the
question of reliability and reliance was “a
matter of confidence over time.” Trust was
built on long use experience and continuity
of use in the operation room.
Excerpt 20
The MSI nurse: (…) So, clinically there’s nice pre-
sentation that we give them [to surgeons] so that
they don’t have to fumble around with all this tech-
nical jargon, they don’t care about that stuff, they
just wanna know: “Can I take this guy’s tumor out or
not?” I mean that’s the bottom line.
Interviewer: Yes. So, how can they be sure that your
information is accurate?
The MSI nurse: (laughs) It’s a good question. It’s...
it’s a matter of confidence over time, and it’s the
same thing when we first brought this technology in:
you’re taking a probe and placing it in someone’s
brain, and you’re telling them where they’re at the
anatomy, and this gives you numbers of how far off
you’re supposed to be, but those numbers don’t
mean anything when it comes down to the surgery.
So, it’s just a matter of how long they’ve used it, how
many cases they’ve done with it, and the more they
do, they start to trust the information on both the
MSI and the System [the intraoperative imaging sys-
tem], and a certain confidence level is there. (…)
Doctor B.N. right now probably has the highest con-
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Figure 7. Systemic conditions of the transitional situation of the intraoperative team, re-
sponsible for operating the multi-modality imaging workstation in the OR at the Institute in
1997
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On the other hand, the nurse seemed to be
slightly confused with the actual building of
that confidence level among the surgeons.
As if trying to make sense of the potential
dilemma now emerging, he discussed about
the surgeons’ interconnected difficulties to
comprehend the meaning of the technology
and to understand and articulate their own
expectations about it. At first, he did not
consider it as a problem that there was cur-
rently only one neurosurgeon in the commu-
nity who was experienced with and relying
on the technology. He saw as important the
“personal interest” in the new technology –
associated with a positive and enthusiastic
attitude toward the technology – for building
up a confidence on it. The presumption of a
personal interest in the adoption of new
technology, in his words “specific to every
surgeon,” posed problems for the creation of
collective confidence on the technology,
constraining also the standardization of that
technology. The reliance on MSI, now per-
sonified in a single experienced surgeon,
was not in line with the urgent challenge of
expanding and sustaining the technology in
collective clinical use at the local hospitals.
In the interview, the nurse tacitly connected
this inherent contradiction with an emerging
collective attempt for its possible resolution.
Excerpt 21
The MSI nurse: Because if they [the surgeons] don’t
understand that (…) then all they have to do is, is to
rely on what you’re [referring to himself] doing. It’s
different whereas if I was to take a plain x-ray ma-
chine out to the OR, they all know how it works,
they know what to expect, so if they don’t get what
they expect, then they yell. It doesn’t always work
that way with us, because they don’t always know
what to expect. (…) It’s really gonna be specific to
every surgeon to... Doctor B.N. actually understands
this technology very well whereas others don’t, it’s
still too new. Doctor B.N. I think has more of a per-
sonal interest in how this type of stuff works where-
as the others don’t really care.(…) So... That’s one
of the reasons we’re also doing this study right now
with the comparison to electrocorticography, be-
cause that is known as the ‘gold standard’, and that
will prove that the MSI is a valid way of doing
things.
The discourse interestingly highlights an
obvious constraint in the activity that main-
tained the creation of expertise merely as an
individual learning process and property. It
seemed to presuppose individual, solo re-
sponsibility by each user in the process,
sometimes isolating those users. Recall the
nurse’s words, “surgeons…have to rely on
what you’re doing” (in excerpt 21), referring
to himself as the one responsible for the re-
liability of applying the results in the oper-
ating situation. This unwritten rule seeming-
ly originated in the early pioneering phase
of the implementation when personal inter-
est in the specific technology may well have
been the crucial precondition for the users to
start the utilization of the new technology.
The situation had changed, however: the
community engaged in applying MEG were
now challenged to move from the experi-
mental pioneer phase to the phase of sus-
taining the technology in a particular collec-
tive practice, in brain tumor surgery. This
new challenge required changing the current
conditions and rules of the activity.
In excerpt 21, the nurse proceeded from
talking about a positive personal interest in
the technology (as compared to “others who
don’t care”), to introducing a recently start-
ed new project. It was a validation study, or-
ganized jointly with the Institute and certain
collaborators from the local hospitals and
aimed at comparing MSI and the known
“gold standard”, the electrocorticography
method, in order to validate, and hopefully
also prove, the clinical value of MEG. This
can be seen as a tacitly perceived intention
to replace the individually experienced reli-
ability and reliance on the technology with a
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collectively experimented reliability through
scientific investigation. This newly estab-
lished project may also be seen as a collec-
tively shared tool, or using Stars (1989) ter-
minology, a boundary object, meant to pro-
vide means for building a more collective
experience and reliance on the technology.
Organizing such a research project indicates
expansion of the object of implementation
along all the four dimensions of expansion.
As showed in this section, the practition-
ers connected the constraints of isolated in-
dividual mastery of MEG to the entire work
process of applying it, starting from the
measurement and analysis event at the
Institute and proceeding to the operation
room at the hospital. As the neuroscientist
and the current MEG analyst of the Institute
advocated, creation of more collaborative
expertise and responsibility should not only
mean transferring the individual mastery of
the isolated pioneer user to equally isolated
other users, but rather, a joint effort of nego-
tiating shared rules of interpretation and val-
idation by those involved. This indicates
moral-ideological expansion in the object of
implementation and corresponds to the chal-
lenge of transitioning from the pioneer
phase of the implementation toward more
established use of the artifact. However, the
desired expansion may require resolving the
tensions of the complex organizational con-




How did the practitioners deal withthe future challenges of the organi-zation and the artifact in the inter-
views? The MEG technologists were simul-
taneously both hopeful and concerned about
the future development at the Institute. They
were hoping for leadership and desired the
articulation of the future direction, yet they
told that they did not know enough about the
plans of the new facility director. They were
not familiar with the plan to focus the work
at the Institute on basic and clinical research.
It seemed that their intention of becoming
knowledgeable over the development of the
work process, as expressed in the interviews,
was not recognized in the community. Al-
though aware of the manifold duties of the
director in the local medical community, the
principal technologist was hoping to involve
the director, together with the MEG staff, in
the development of the whole MEG process
and the technology at the Institute.
Excerpt 22
Technologist 1: (…) what his [the Director’s] ideas
are I don’t know yet...because he’s only been with us
a short time and has been really focusing his efforts
on the larger clinical application in this division
which is the MRI program. But I hope to involve
him more heavily in the MEG with all of the basic
questions on data collection, first to show him what
the questions are, where the errors might be pro-
duced... and maybe troubleshoot a better way to do
that... and then next: move him into the data analy-
sis and review portion so that he can get a whole pic-
ture as to the whole process and help us develop the
technology.
The scientists engaged in the data analysis
were concerned about finding more clinical
applications for MEG in the near future.
Although they saw MEG already as a poten-
tial clinical tool, for instance, in neuro-
surgery, they were somewhat concerned
about running out of time in creating new
applications and surviving financially in the
competition with other new imaging tech-
nologies. They also stressed the need for a
great deal of further research and develop-
ment work and for comparison of MEG data
with other already established methods. A
single site could not achieve all that alone.
There had not yet been much research col-
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laboration between the sites working with
these issues.
The MRI scientist and the collaborating
clinicians did not yet perceive MEG as a
clinical tool; it was at the research phase,
and a great number of studies with normal
subjects and with patients were still needed.
Ironically, the clinical application they had
intensively developed and used so far, the
functional brain mapping (MSI), was not
considered the “killer application” of MEG.
It was the one to start with, while research-
ing simultaneously other options bringing
out the true advantage of MEG.
Excerpt 23
Scientist 1: (…) before it [the MEG] will be useful
in the other applications (…) we need to spend a lot
of basic research time finding out what normals look
like. A small amount of that has been done, but a
tremendous amount more needs to be done, and the
data needs to come to the same level that EEG has
been at for great many years before we can really
use it to evaluate other types of diseases.
Excerpt 24
Scientist 2: I think there are applications where
MEG will be the clinical modality of choice. I don’t
see that the basic functional mapping – applications
that we spend a lot of time doing – will be that ap-
plication. (…) my opinion is that epilepsy applica-
tions will be the killer out for getting MEG standard
established. You really have to take into account the
timing advantage of MEG. (…) epilepsy, which re-
ally involves the timing, to a large extent really high-
lights that advantage whereas in somatomotor, you
don’t use the timing at all (…) so the clinical appli-
cations must use that strength of timing. (…) I defi-
nitely believe MEG will survive, but as a routine
clinical tool, I think it has a long way to go.
The main collaborating neurosurgeon and
the neurologist engaged in the validation
study addressed the clinical potential and
advantages of MEG in solving particular on-
going problems of their medical practice.
For the neurosurgeon’s point of view, MSI
was already able to provide important infor-
mation for planning a surgical approach in a
neurosurgery operation. In difficult tumor
cases, surgeons usually used invasive elec-
trocorticography (EcoG) prior to the actual
surgery, in order to identify the eloquent
cortex in relation to the tumor. Sometimes
the electrodes (grids) for cortical stimula-
tion, placed on the surface of the brain, did
not work properly, or, the size of the hole
opened on the scull restricted the proper
placing of the grids. A possibility of avoid-
ing these additional invasive preoperative
evaluations on patients with the MSI was
seen as an important advantage.
Excerpt 25
Clinician 1: What you saw in the last corticography
is a classic example of why corticography is needed.
Neurosurgeon oftentimes determines visually where
the motor cortex is. And sometimes it is very diffi-
cult because the tumor can alter the anatomy of the
brain, so what one thinks is the motor strip, is not.
Excerpt 26
Neurosurgeon: The problem is that with the cor-
ticography, you get one shot with the patient, you
take patient to the operating room, you are opening
up the scull … We recently had a case where there
was a failure of the grids, they were not recording
properly and you had no localizing information.
With the MSI, you get it all preoperatively, so if it
does not work at the one time you can go back and
repeat it and get it right before you go to the operat-
ing room. That is a huge advantage. And also the
EcoG makes you do all your decision making intra-
operatively. Anything that can be done preoperative-
ly can be taking into account to plan the surgical ap-
proach, to inform the patient about the risks, how
high or low they may be, and to guide both the sur-
geon and the patient to make the choices of opera-
tion.
The collaborating neurologist addressed the
potential of MSI in localizing non-invasive-
ly epilepsy seizures, although there re-
mained many unknown questions in it. He
33
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advocated further research on the capabili-
ties and limitations of MEG in regard to
epilepsy before applying the information to
full scale clinical work. He was currently
conducting research on the topic at the
University of New Mexico. He was also an
expert of clinical neurophysiology proce-
dures in the validation study aimed at com-
paring the information acquired from MSI
with the recognized, accepted “gold stan-
dard” (EcoG). The information was consid-
ered important for the standardization of the
application, since there hasn’t been direct
head-to-head comparison between MEG
and EcoG.
The collaborating neurosurgeon – already
an actual user of the technology – saw the
future development and use of MEG in opti-
mistic terms. He was already content with
the level of accuracy provided by MSI when
used in actual operating.
Excerpt 27
The current state of MSI makes it extremely useful
for sensory cortex localization and it does that, what
we feel, with the level of accuracy that exceeds
EcoG. (…) MSI can localize these cortical regions
in true three dimensional space whereas corticogra-
phy is really a two dimensional recording across the
surface of the brain. And it therefore, in my opinion,
is the most accurate way to localize sensory cortex
presently. Use and evolution of image guided surgi-
cal navigation techniques has made this kind of
technology– it is a natural marriage to put those two
technologies together (…) (Neurosurgeon)
Interestingly enough, the neurosurgeon rec-
ognized the challenges for collaboration in
the complex organizational setting currently
involved in the validation study. He was
aware of some of the ongoing organization-
al transitions at the Institute. Yet he believed
that “users with great demand” and “a busi-
ness attitude” towards the endeavor will
eventually be the key in solving the prob-
lems of the complex organization.
Excerpt 28
We are a very complicated organization, because the
unit referring to the Institute] is housed in a govern-
ment owned hospital and the neuroimaging group
exists as a separate entity outside of this government
hospital (…) It takes a fair amount of co-operation
to get all that set up. The network will become even
more complicated over time as we start not only to
become familiar with this technology but to rely on
it, when it becomes a standard way to do neurosur-
gical procedures. (…) If there are users with great
demand, everyone will be well motivated to work
things out, and these things do work out. Everybody
understands how business goes and that we have to
do business, and then we’ll do it. (Neurosurgeon)
The situation of the neurosurgeon as an end-
user of multi-modality imaging techniques
may be summarized with the help of Figure
8, depicting the unarticulated contradiction
of the activity of sustaining and expanding
MEG in neurosurgery.
If compared to the transitional conditions of
the other practitioners in the process of
functional brain mapping for neurosurgery,
this particular surgeon did not suffer from
such concerns and uncertainties that were
expressed by the technologists and the sci-
entists. He needed reliable and timely func-
tional brain mapping information for opera-
tions and he saw no particular problems in
acquiring them. He represented a lead user
(von Hippel, 1988), a user with great de-
mand, and also a strategically important
powerful boundary spanner (e.g., Leonard,
1998) between organizations. He brought
the customer perspective to the process, in-
terested in one application of the technolo-
gy. He seemed to believe in rational behav-
ior of the actors, tacitly assuming that all
participants in the endeavor have a similar
vision and a shared object of activity, as well
as equal possibilities to acquire knowledge
and expertise on the process. As shown in
this paper, the assumption that transition ap-
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pears the same to everybody even within a
single organization is very problematic. The
lighting-shaped two-headed arrow between
the object and the community in Figure 8
describes this potential constraint in the fu-
ture resolution of differing priorities and ob-
jects within and between activity systems.
To sum up, the practitioners were capable
of considering the artifact and its future ap-
plications reflectively and in developmental
terms, also interpreting the possible alterna-
tives of development in a broader frame of
imaging modalities. Though they were con-
cerned or slightly worried about the future,
they were not paralyzed with the uncertain
situation. Interestingly enough, not only the
main collaborating neurosurgeon – as a cus-
tomer – but also the technologists working
on the laboratory shop floor expressed moti-
vation and commitment to developing fur-
ther the work with the artifact at the Insti-
tute. It seemed that the practitioners had no
choice: they had to take responsibility over
the future development and application
work due to the long distance to the original
developer company. However, the concerns
and commitments were not shared among
practitioner groups. At this point, the object
of implementation seemed to be shared only
in the imagination of various practitioners.
9. Conclusions
In this paper, I have analyzed the imple-mentation of a hybrid artifact – the neu-romagnetometer device – from the view-
point of one user organization, the New
Mexico Institute of Neuroimaging, during
the period in which it was facing a challenge
of moving from the introductory phase of the
implementation toward the more established
adoption into clinical use. The analysis
shows that the anticipated transformation of
the artifact, through trials of implementation
35
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Figure 8. Systemic conditions of the transitional situation of the neurosurgeon collaborating
with the Institute, in 1997
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and adoption, constituted a major challenge
also for the Institute and its practitioners.
I applied the concept of expansion in the
analysis of interview data and found that the
perceptions of the practitioner groups in-
volved in the implementation indicate ex-
pansion of the object of implementation
along the social-spatial, anticipatory-tempo-
ral, moral-ideological, and systemic-devel-
opmental dimensions of expansion. The per-
ceptions of the participants about the transi-
tional process at the Institute and the related
network are summarized in Table 2. Per-
ceptions of the same type are combined and
categorized according to the four expansive
dimensions of the object and the three levels
of organizational context relevant to the
transition.
Table 2 illustrates the multi-voiced char-
acter of implementation, consisting of het-
erogeneous occupational groups and differ-
ent organizational contexts. The local com-
munity involved in applying MEG consisted
of several loosely coupled activity systems
with different objects and tools, as well as
different places and schedules of work. Each
practitioner group seemed to have a specific
and partial point of view, and different kinds
of concerns toward the transition. However,
among all practitioner groups, and along all
four dimensions of expansion, especially
one common concern and contradiction
continued showing up in the data. This was
the tension between isolated individual ex-
pertise and responsibility in applying MEG
and the simultaneous challenge to establish
the use of MEG in preoperative planning of
neurosurgical patients.
The findings concerning the expansions
shed new light on the role of an individual
product champion as the main agent in suc-
cessful adoption (Maidique, 1980). The di-
mensions of expansion applied here re-
vealed the obvious need – and also the vari-
ous constraints – of transferring individual
expertise to a user collective. The findings
of the present case study did not indicate a
next user-champion to be the main agent to
achieve this transition.
The social-spatial dimension of expan-
sion not only indicated requirements for
continuous integration of different technolo-
gies, but also an intention by the practition-
ers to enlarge the functional and spatial
scope of work. This integration of separate
work practices into a shared work process
presupposes collective action, negotiating a
common ground for the emerging new
phase of implementation. The anticipatory-
temporal dimension revealed a desire to
broaden the temporal trajectories of imple-
mentation. Transitioning from an introduc-
tory phase toward the consolidation phase of
implementation enlarges the trajectory to in-
clude also the continuity and reproducibility
of results. Maintaining these within a com-
plex organizational context will require a
collective subject, a recognized collabora-
tive structure, as responsible for the endea-
vor. The moral-ideological dimension show-
ed an urgent need to spread and share the
isolated, individual application expertise
within the wider user community. This will
require negotiated rules of clinical interpre-
tation and decision-making as well as more
basic research work for understanding the
advantages and limitations of the applica-
tion. Finally, the systemic-developmental
dimension lends support to the idea of a col-
lective subject as a motor for anticipated
transition. All practitioners – not only the
high-ranking specialists – showed commit-
ment to and responsibility for future devel-
opment of the application and the technolo-
gy.
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“subjective interpreta-
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a “complex user orga-
nization“ (neurosur-
geon)
A need for more time
for MEG to become fi-
nancially viable and to
survive in the competi-
tion (scientist 3)
Increasing number of
MEG sites need urgent-
ly more training and
qualified personnel
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shared rules, a “field”
(scientist 1, clinician 2)
MEG supplier should
lead the work of tech-
nical problem solving
at the sites (scientist 2,
scientist 3)
A need for division of
research objectives be-









and vision to start fo-
cusing on clinical ser-
vice (tech 2, tech 3)
Development of the
MEG program will be-
come critical to the use
of neurosurgical appli-
cation (nurse)
Other hospitals in the
area will become in-
volved using MSI in
neurosurgical opera-
tions in the future (neu-
rosurgeon)
A need to find more
clinical applications for
MEG to survive in the
competition (scientist
1, scientist 3)
MEG still needs R&D
before becoming a clin-
ical tool (clinician 1,
scientist 2)
MEG will be useful
and when its clinical
value is approved, its
use will spread (neuro-
surgeon)
Table 2. Perceptions of participants about the transitional process of the Institute and relat-
ed network (the shortened term “tech” stands for technologist)
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These results suggest that the major contra-
diction – between the emerging new object
of implementation and the prevailing rules
and division of labor causing the isolated
user expertise to continue at the Institute –
can not be understood only in terms of mu-
tual adaptation of the technology and user
environment. It can be understood as signal-
ing for a need and an opportunity for expan-
sion. Expansion revealed in the present case
was, primarily, emergence of a new, poten-
tially shared object of activity within and be-
tween practitioner groups. Expansion of the
object involves the practitioners to recognize
the different objects and requirements of the
pioneer phase of the implementation on the
one hand, and the new phase of establishing
the application to medical practice on the
other hand. The capability to understand the
significance of the current transition and to
make the difference between the two phases
of implementation, in other words, the abi-
lity to make expansive distinctions, was
emerging among the practitioners.
Transition enables and requires this capa-
bility also in the creation of new tools, rules,
and division of labor within the Institute’s
activity system. In this respect, local transi-
tion drives further integration and develop-
ment of the imaging technologies and other
systems, including MEG. As showed in the
present analysis, expansion needs to include
all elements of the activity system. In the
adoption of radically new technologies, mu-
tual adaptation and conformation of the
technology and user organization are not
enough. The artifact as a merely fixed “thing”
into which users adapt should be ques-
tioned. Hence, user activity should not be
seen as something given or predetermined.
Rather, adoption into use involves the user
activity to expand along the four dimensions
suggested here. However, this constitutes a
major learning challenge for the user orga-
nization involved.
A crucial challenge of the Institute was
related to the need for collective expertise
and responsibility in the emerging new
phase of the implementation. The new vali-
dation project indicated movement toward
this direction. This project was a potential
shared tool among the practitioner groups.
However, the meaning of this endeavor as an
expansive tool and possibility was not yet
fully recognized within the community. It
seemed also that all practitioner groups did
not have the same access to the information
about the new plans.
The emerging new object, the endeavor to
establish the use of the artifact in neurosur-
gical practice, may remain only partially
shared if not made visible by deliberate ef-
fort among practitioners. The findings of
this case analysis about the partial and sepa-
rate perceived objects of implementation
among the practitioners do not support the
idea of invisibility as a desired objective for
implementation, suggested by Leonard-Bar-
ton and Kraus (1985). The blind men need
shared tools to perceive the elephant.
Smooth, invisible “hand-off” to end-users is
a problematic ideal that can hardly be
achieved in real life.
What needed to happen in the case of the
Institute and in similar cases of implement-
ing complex new technology? The isolated
or partial perspectives of the practitioners in
the critical phase of implementation can be
seen as an opportunity for expansion. The
results suggest that expansion requires col-
lective visualization of work and reflective
dialogue on it among the practitioner groups.
In order to start creating mutual understand-
ing, practitioners and different sub-groups
can be encouraged to consciously analyze,
represent and communicate their perspec-
tives to each other. It is shown however, that
this kind of metacommunicative action is
difficult to achieve spontaneously and main-
tain coherent within hazardous work situa-
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tions (Hasu, 2000; Hasu & Engeström,
2000).
Activity-theoretical concepts and methods
have been employed experimentally to over-
come such problems. Intervention methods
for collective visualization of work and
shared meta-tools for dialogical diagnosis,
problem solving and work redesign at actual
work settings are recently being developed
and tested (e.g. Engeström, 1999). The fu-
ture challenge for the present research will
be both further developing these analytical
tools and analyzing their value for the orga-
nizations implementing new technology.
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